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ON BEHALF OF THE PAP-ISTS: 
A REPLY TO BERGMANN 
Thomas P. Flint 
In his "Molinist Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Free Will Defense," 
Michael Bergmann offers a clever and novel assault on the Principle of 
Alternate Possibilities (PAP), one that avoids most of the traps that have hob-
bled other Frankfurtians. Nevertheless, the counterexample he proposes is 
one where real questions can be raised concerning both the moral responsibili-
ty of the agent and the undetermined nature of his action. Furthermore, most 
agent-causationists would insist that the situation Bergmann envisions is ulti-
mately incoherent. Hence, whether or not Bergmann is right to reject PAP, his 
argument offers us insufficient reason to do so. 
Michael Bergmann's "Molinist Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the 
Free Will Defense" offers an ingenious argument for the claim that, even if 
we do not implicitly assume the falsity either of incompatibilism or of the 
theory of agency, there is a solid Frankfurtian counterexample to the 
Principle of Alternate Possibilities: 
PAP. A person is morally responsible for performing a given act 
only if she could have acted otherwise. 
Bergmann's assault on PAP is novel and clever, one which avoids most of 
the traps that have hobbled other Frankfurtians. What's more, his conclu-
sion may well be correct; libertarian advocates of agent-causation may well 
be able to reject PAP. Nevertheless, I am not convinced that his argument 
can claim to have shown that this is the case. 
Bergmann asks us to assume the admittedly controversial thesis that 
there are counterfactual truths akin to the counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom that Molinists have famously defended in their discussions of 
middle knowledge.! His counterexample involves a situation in which the 
following counterfactual is true of a certain agent Jones: 
A. If from t* until t Jones were in circumstances K and Demon did-
n't take away Jones's powers at t with respect to VI [a volition to 
pull the trigger of the gun in Jones's hand], then Jones would agent-
cause VI at t. 
Assume that the antecedent of A is true and that the following conditional 
is also true: 
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C. If A were false, Demon would know it (long before t) and would 
take away jones's powers at t with respect to VI. 
Then, says Bergmann, Jones does agent-cause VI and is morally responsi-
ble for so doing (since Demon does not in fact need to intervene). But con-
sider the propositions 
E. From t* up until t Jones is in circumstances K 
and 
F. At t Jones exercises his power to do otherwise than cause VI at t. 
We can show, says Bergmann, that 
13. If C, then if E then -F 
is a necessary truth. Since both C and E would have been true no matter 
which of his powers Jones had exercised, it follows (via a type of transfer of 
powerlessness principle) that F would have been false no matter which of 
his powers Jones had exercised. So Jones can do nothing other than agent-
cause VI. And since he is, as we already noted, morally responsible for 
agent-causing VI, it follows that Jones is morally responsible even though 
he couldn't have done otherwise. Hence, PAP is false. 
Problems for Bergmann begin to surface when we consider more care-
fully the second conjunct of the antecedent of A-that is, 
G. Demon didn't take away Jones's powers at t with respect to VI. 
G, alas, is ambiguous. It can be taken either as 
Gl. Demon didn't take away all oJJones's powers at t with respect to 
VI. 
or as 
G2. Demon didn't take away any a/Jones's powers at t with respect 
to VI. 
Which reading does Bergmann intend? Well, G is supposed to be true in 
the counterexample Bergmann is constructing. But it's hard to see how G2 
could be true in that situation. Demon, after all, has made C true, and the 
result (if Bergmann is right) is that Jones lacks the power to do anything 
other than cause VI, a power that presumably Jones would have had if 
Demon either were not on the scene or had not formed the intention that 
makes C true.2 So it doesn't seem that G can be read as G2 if Bergmann's 
argument is to work.' 
What happens if we take G as GI rather than G2-Le., if we assume that 
Bergmann's PAP-disconfirming situation is one in which Demon takes 
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away some but not all of Jones's powers? As we have seen, Demon does 
take away Jones's power to agent-cause anything other than VI. What 
other powers might Jones have relative to VI? Many agency theorists, I 
think, would say that he might have the power to do nothing with respect 
to VI - the power to not agent-cause VI or anything else in the neighbor-
hood. The idea here is not that Jones intentionally refrains from agent-caus-
ing VI, for then one might reasonably say that he does agent-cause some-
thing (the relevant intention) after all. Rather, the picture here is of the sort 
of non-intentional refraining (if we can so call it) that goes on all the time. 
Five minutes ago, I refrained in this sense from throwing my telephone out 
the window. I had the power to de fenestrate the phone, but I failed to 
exercise the power, not because I formed the intention not to exercise it, but 
because I did nothing whatsoever with respect to the phone. Can Demon 
leave Jones with this sort of power - the power to (non-intentionally) 
refrain from agent-causing VI? 
Suppose Jones were left with this power. What would have happened if 
Jones were to exercise it? That is, if 
R. Jones refrains from agent-causing VI at t 
were true, what would follow? Well, there's no reason to think that Jones 
wouldn't still be in circumstances K.4 And, of course, if Jones refrains from 
agent-causing VI when in K, it's not the case that he would agent-cause VI 
if in K. So it seems clear that 
(i) R ~ _AS 
Now, Jones could exercise his power to refrain only if Demon has not 
taken away that power. And if Demon didn't take away that power, then 
obviously he didn't take away all of Jones's powers. So 
(ii) R ~ GI 
is also true. From (i) and (ii) it follows that 
(iii) R ~ (-A & GI). 
Clearly, 
(iv) (-A & GI) => -(-A ~ -Gl) 
is also true. From (iii) and (iv), it follows that 
(v) R~ -(-A ~ -Gl).6 
Now, as BergmmID (correctly) notes, "the consequent of C entails the falsi-
ty of G". Since, as we've seen, G needs to be read as Gl, the consequent of 
C entails the falsity of GI. And, given that the antecedent of C just is -A, it 
follows that 
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(vi) C:::::} (~A ---'7 ~GI). 
Together, (v) and (vi) entail 
(vii) R ---'7 ~c. 
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So, if Demon leaves Jones with the power to refrain from doing anything 
with respect to VI, then Jones has a power which, if exercised, would mean 
the falsity of C. But if Jones has a power the exercise of which counterfac-
tually implies the falsity of C, then C wouldn't have been true no matter 
which of his powers Jones exercised. And thus the second part of 
Bergmann's argument in section 2.4 would crumble, for premise 16 would 
be demonstrably false. 
So Bergmann cannot allow Demon to leave Jones the power even non-
intentionally to refrain; Demon's behavior has to rob Jones even of this 
power. The situation that results from Demon's making C true has to be 
one in which Jones not only cannot agent-cause anything other than VI, 
but also cannot (non-intentionally) refrain from agent-causing VI. But if 
that is so, it seems to me that the counterexample is vulnerable on at least 
three related fronts. 
First, Jones's moral responsibility for agent-causing VI is much less clear 
that it first appeared. Following the typical Frankfurtian line, Bergmann 
asks us if Jones wouldn't clearly be responsible if there were no Demon; 
adding Demon to the situation is then supposed to make no moral differ-
ence since Demon never intervenes. But if there were no Demon, none of 
Jones's powers would have been snatched away from him. Why assume 
that the presence of that panoply of powers plays no role in our thinking 
that the Demon-less Jones is so obviously responsible? Bergmann employs 
the ususal Frankfurtian misdirection when he says that, in the counterex-
ample he describes, Jones acts "with absolutely no interference or influence 
from Demon." Even if we agree that Demon doesn't cause Jones to agent-
cause VI, the fact that he's sealed off all other avenues - even that of non-
intentionally refraining - makes nonsense of the claim that there has been 
no interference or influence. And while the degree of Demonic interven-
tion here may not make it obvious that Jones is not responsible, it surely 
does call that responsibility into question. 
In raising this first objection, we assumed that Demon doesn't cause 
Jones's act of causing VI. The second problem with Bergmann's counterex-
ample is that this assumption seems questionable. Demon has set up a situ-
ation in which there's only one thing Jones can cause, and where he can't 
refrain from exercising his power to cause it. This surely seems like a situa-
tion in which Demon has caused Jones to exercise his power to agent-cause 
VI. And this even Bergmann would allow cannot be; his third condition of 
agent causation (AC in section 1.2) implies that nothing distinct from Jones 
could cause Jones to agent-cause anything. So Bergmann's counterexample 
may be incoherent even on his own account of agent-causation. 
The third problem for Bergmann is that, whatever the implications of his 
notion of agent-causation on his counterexample, the situation he envisions 
is one which is clearly incoherent on the picture of agent-causation that is, I 
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suspect, most widely embraced. On that picture, one that the paterfamilias 
of agency theory himself, Thomas Reid, clearly promoted, it simply makes 
no sense to say that a person has the power to cause something but not the 
power not to cause it. As we have seen, Bergmann's counterexample 
requires that Demon leave Jones with the power to cause VI, but not with 
the power to refrain from causing it. And that, Reid and company would 
insist, is simply impossible: "Power to produce any effect, implies power 
not to produce it."7 
Despite its many virtues, then, Bergmann's attack on PAP seems seri-
ously deficient. Whether or not that means that PAP itself, or at least 
something very much like PAP, should be embraced by the agent-causa-
tionist libertarian is, of course, another matter.8 If there are cogent reasons 
to abandon or modify PAP, though, agent-causationists are not likely to 
find them in Bergmann's argument.9 
University of Notre Dame 
NOTES 
1. As Bergmann is aware, the conditionals he employs in his argument are 
distinct from those that Molinists have defended. Counterfactuals of creature-
ly freedom have antecedents that are complete (i.e., that include all the "hard 
facts" over which the agent in question has no control) and consequents that 
state how the agent in question would freely act. Bergmann's subjunctive con-
ditionals of agent causation make no claim to have complete antecedents and 
make no assumption concerning the freedom of the acts of agent-causation 
mentioned in their consequents. 
2. I am assuming that C's truth is dependent upon Demon's actions. This 
surely seems to be implied by Bergmann's contention (in defense of his 
Premise 16) that Jones could have no power over C because its truth is ground-
ed in "the firmness of Demon's plan. . .. Demon is committed to acting in 
accord with c." Demon's actions (his making plans and commitments), then, 
have resulted in the truth of C. Indeed, it seems clear that Bergmann should 
also maintain that C's truth is the consequence of Demon's undetermined 
actions. For suppose that the causal history of the world (H) and the laws of 
nature (L) at the time of Demon's planning together entailed Demon's action, 
and thus entailed C. Assuming the soundness of Bergmann's argument that C 
entails (E:::l -F), it would then follow that (H & L) entails (E :::l -F). And from 
this it would follow that (H & L & E) entails -F. But it's hard to see how 
Jones's act of agent-causing VI could be seen as anything other than causally 
determined if this final entailment held. And, of course, even given 
Bergmmm's account of agent causation (AC in section 1.2), it's simply impossi-
ble for an event to be both agent-caused and causally determined. So, if 
Bergmann is to avoid such problems, he'd best insist that the act of Demon's 
upon which C depends not be a causally determined act. 
3. G2 would be, for Bergmann, an unfriendly reading of G for a slightly 
more technical reason as well: it renders the first part of his argument in sec-
tion 2.4 invalid. That argument requires that G be entailed by F. But G2 does-
n't follow from F. What F entails is that Demon didn't take away Jones's 
power to do otherwise than cause VI; it doesn't entail that Demon left Jones 
with the power to cause VI. So, though F does entail GI, it doesn't entail G2. 
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If G were read as G2, then, the argument would collapse. 
4. If one thought that circumstances K wouldn't still obtain if Jones were to 
exercise his power to refrain from agent-causing VI, one would be doing 
Bergmann no favors, for then the second part of his argument in section 2.4 
would dissolve, since 19 would no longer hold. 
5. Here and throughout, I use the single-line arrow (~) to represent coun-
terfactual implication and the double-line arrow (~) to represent strict implica-
tion (i.e., entailment). 
6. The principle that warrants the move from (iii) and (iv) to (v) could be 
stated as, "If (X ~ Y) and (Y ~ Z), then (X ~ Z)". 
7. From the 1983 printing by Georg Olms Verlag of The Works of Thomas 
Reid, 8th ed., ed. by William Hamilton (Edinburgh, 1895), p. 523. Quoted in 
William Rowe, "The Metaphysics of Freedom: Reid's Theory of Agent 
Causation,"American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2000), p. 445. 
8. For what it's worth, I must confess that I am not myself a confirmed 
PAP-ist; my suspicion is that PAP isn't quite what the agent-causationist needs. 
Even a Reidean agent-causationist, I think, could grant the possibility of a situ-
ation where the only options Demon leaves open for Jones are agent-causing 
VI or refraining from causing anything. If Jones were in that case to agent-
cause VI, he would seem to be morally responsible. But he could not have 
done anything else. His only alternative was to (non-intentionally) refrain, and 
such a refraining is not a doing. Even if PAP is discredited by such examples, 
though, it seems clear that it has close relatives that would prove more resilient 
- e.g., something along the lines of 
P AP* A person is morally responsible for perforIillng a given act only if 
she could have (non-intentionally) refrained from performing it 
or perhaps 
P AP** A person is morally responsible for agent-causing X only if she 
could have (non-intentionally) refrained from agent-causing X. 
9. I wish to thank Stewart Goetz for his helpful comments on an earlier 
draft of this paper. 
